Canada has strengthened intellectual property (IP) protections for pharmaceutical drugs several times over the last 3 decades. This study investigates whether the IP changes had an effect on the market exclusivity time of brand products on the Ontario Drug Benefit (ODB) formulary. We constructed a database that included the first brand approval date for drugs launched between 1974 and 2012, the first ODB listing date of the brand drug, and the first ODB listing date of the generic form of the drug. We then calculated the time of formulary exclusivity to detect any changes in market exclusivity times associated with changes to Canada's IP regimen. There were 595 drugs launched between 1974 and 2012 that were available for analysis. Exclusivity gradually declined from the late 1970s to 1990. Drugs approved in 2004 received 7.6 years of exclusivity, and drugs approved in 2005 received 5 years of exclusivity. Over the time period we analyzed, market exclusivity time of brand
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After 1987, Canada's IP rules were strengthened several times. In 1987, the Canadian government provided brand drugs with a minimum 7-year period of market exclusivity as a consequence of the 1987 Free Trade Agreement with the United States. In other words, generic drugs could not be sold until 7 years after the brand drug had been approved for use. (A 10-year term applied if the generic firm imported the active pharmaceutical ingredients; the brand-name drug was provided 7 years of market exclusivity if the generic firm manufactured the active ingredients domestically.) The government also changed the patent term to 20 years from the date when the patent application was filed, effective in 1989. 2 Legislation passed in 1993, but retroactive to the end of 1991, abolished compulsory licensing. This was done to comply with the 1993 North America Free Trade Agreement and the 1994 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement (a worldwide agreement). The 1993 legislation also introduced so-called "linkage" regulations; these restricted generic entry when patents deemed relevant by the brand firm were still in effect. 3 In 2006, the federal government provided enhanced "data protection" regulations; these had the effect of providing brand drugs containing new active ingredients with a minimum 8-year period of market exclusivity. 4 (The extension of data protection was not related to a trade agreement.)
Although the federal government is responsible for IP policy, most publicly insured drug costs are paid for by provincial and territorial drug plans. Public plans account for almost 37% of all drug expenditures. 5 Longer periods of market exclusivity delay the appearance of generic products and can increase the amount spent by provincial public drug plans. The impact of IP protection on drug plan generosity has received little attention in the literature. The one study we are aware of, that by Grootendorst and Matteo, 6 found that drug costs did not increase markedly after Canada increased IP protection in 1987 and 1993. That study suggested that countervailing responses on the part of drug plans, as well as the introduction of patented drug price controls by the federal government, could have played a role.
We undertook an exploratory study to investigate whether changes to Canadian IP protection are associated with changes in the coverage decisions of provincial formularies. We focused on the formulary of the Ontario Drug Benefit (ODB) program, the provincial government plan for seniors, welfare recipients, residents of long-term care facilities, and others with high drug costs relative to income. The ODB is the single largest drug plan in Canada and accounts for 41% of the $11.4 billion spent on prescription drugs in the province in 2015.
7 Specifically, we examine the percent of newly approved brand drugs listed on the ODB formulary, the time between drug approval and formulary listing, and the time between formulary listing and the formulary listing of the first interchangeable generic drug (i.e., "formulary exclusivity") over the period 1974-2012.
Methods
Our focus was on oral solid dosage forms (i.e., tablets and capsules) of new prescription molecules approved for human use in Canada from January 1974 to December 2012, inclusive. Oral solid formulations account for over 80% of prescription drug sales 8 and tend to be the primary targets for generic companies. We categorized new products into 1 of the following 5 dominant dosage forms: (1) regular release tablets or capsules, (2) sustained release (including controlled delivery) tablets or capsules, (3) delayed release (including enteric coated) tablets, (4) orally disintegrating tablets, and (5) chewable tablets, since each of these requires a unique generic equivalent. For each drug (defined as unique drug molecule-dosage form combination), we assembled data on the first brand drug approval date, first ODB listing date of the brand drug, and the first ODB listing date of the generic form of the drug.
Our primary data source for drug approvals was Health Canada's Drug Product Database (DPD) 9 ; these data record regulatory activity (such as approval dates, post-market drug withdrawal dates, and new therapeutic indications) of prescribed drugs for human and veterinary use. Health Canada drug approval is by way of a "Notice of Compliance," or NOC.
The DPD database for drugs approved prior to 1996 is incomplete, in 2 ways. First, it contains no information on the NOC dates of brand drugs that were withdrawn from the market prior to 1996. For instance, the DPD contains no NOC data for brand-name Tagamet (cimetidine) tablets, as this drug was withdrawn for commercial reasons prior to 1996. Second, for some drugs the DPD provides just the year of approval; for others, NOC years are incorrect. We thus double-checked the NOC dates provided in the DPD using information from other sources. First, we compared NOC dates in the DPD with those given in Health Canada's NOC database. 10 The NOC database accurately records NOC dates for drugs receiving NOCs from 1991 and onwards. We also added drugs identified in the NOC database that were not found in the DPD. Pre-1991 NOCs were compared to information contained in the "top 200 prescription products tables" of the periodical Pharmacy Practice. Each year, starting in 1992, Pharmacy Practice provides a list of the most commonly prescribed drug products, along with the year and month of the first sale of these drugs. The data were generated by IMS Health Canada and supplemented by a list of all prescription drug sales in 2006 provided by IMS-Brogan.
We also determined NOC dates from various issues of the Compendium of Pharmaceutical Specialties (CPS). This publication of the Canadian Pharmaceutical Association, published since 1960 and annually since 1971, provides product monographs and other information on the approved uses and dosing for prescribed drugs available in Canada. A drug's NOC date can in some cases be ascertained by the date printed on the first product monograph available for the drug. If no product monograph is available, NOC dates can be bounded within a 12-month interval by identifying the issue of the CPS in which the drug first appeared. A drug that first appears in, say, the April 1987 CPS was likely launched between the publication of the previous issue of the CPS and March 1987. We used the midpoint of these dates as the NOC date. Drugs that appeared in the 1973 CPS could not have been launched after 1974 and were thus excluded. A number of drugs whose NOC dates could not be ascertained using the IMS or CPS data had NOCs listed as December 31 of the relevant year; this date appeared to be incorrect. To minimize expected measurement error, we changed the NOC to July 1 of the relevant year.
As noted, we flagged the earliest NOC date for each molecule-dosage form combination. We therefore retained the earliest NOC date of co-marketed drugs, such as lisinopril. We also excluded "repurposed" drugs. For example, finasteride was initially approved to treat benign prostatic hypertrophy in 1992 (under the brand name Proscar) and was then approved to treat hair loss in 1998 (Propecia). We thus included Proscar but excluded Propecia.
Next, we identified the ODB formulary listing date, if any, of approved brand drugs. List dates of drugs approved after 1996 were obtained from the ODB's online formulary. 11 We obtained the listing dates of other approved drugs from the printed ODB formularies starting with the first edition in 1974 to the December 19, 2006 , update of the 35th edition. Since the printed formularies do not give the actual date that the drug was first reimbursed, we used the formulary's publication date. We then searched the formularies for the date that an interchangeable generic competitor first appeared. The ODB removed some brand drugs from the formulary prior to the listing of interchangeable generics. As an example, the sustained release forms of the beta blockers metoprolol and propranolol (among other drugs) were delisted in October 1993. We identified the delisting dates, if any, of the brand drugs that appeared on the formulary. Formulary exclusivity was then defined as the time between formulary listing and the earlier of generic entry and brand delisting. ODB formulary listing dates were independently obtained by 2 authors: A.F. and T.R. (acting as a team) and M.S. Discrepancies were resolved by P.G. and J.L.
We excluded molecules that were withdrawn from the market for safety reasons prior to generic entry. Examples here include cisapride and valdecoxib. We identified the list of withdrawn molecules from 2 articles published by Lexchin. 12, 13 The withdrawal dates listed in these papers were corroborated using data from the DPD and NOC databases.
The 2 duration outcomes we focused on, i.e., the time between drug approval and formulary listing ("time to listing") and the duration of formulary exclusivity, were censored for some drugs. We retained observations on drugs with censored formulary exclusivity values and computed durations observed at the time we last checked the ODB formulary, August 30, 2016. We computed summary statistics of the listing outcomes by year of brand drug NOC. We reported the duration outcomes as medians to account for any outliers that may distort means. We visually inspected graphs of the fraction of approved drugs that were listed, the median time to listing and median period of formulary exclusivity to detect any abrupt changes in the ODB formulary listing outcomes for drugs receiving an NOC in 1987-1989 and 1991-1993 , the dates when, and just after, the most important changes were made to the IP policies. To reduce the number of censored observations, we focused on drugs with NOCs issued from 1974 to 2005 when computing the median number of years of formulary exclusivity. We focused on drugs with NOCs issued from 1974 to 2012 when computing the median time to listing. Drugs that are line extensions, i.e., new dosage forms of existing molecules, do not always qualify for the full patent term and may therefore bias the results. We therefore repeated our analysis after removing this group of drugs. Finally, we conducted a regression-based test for a structural break in time trends of the outcome variables due to policy change. This tested whether the slope and intercept of the trend line of the outcome variable (median time to ODB listing, or median time of ODB formulary exclusivity) estimated during the compulsory licensing era (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) changed in the postcompulsory licensing era (1993 and onwards). (Data for the transition years 1988-1992 were not used for this test). All computations were performed using Stata version 13.
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Results
We identified 612 new oral solid drugs that were launched between 1974 and 2012. Of these drugs, 424 were found in both the DPD and NOC database, 169 were found in the DPD database only, and 19 were found in the NOC database only. We could not ascertain the NOC date for 17 drugs; these were dropped, leaving 595 for analysis. Figure 1 To get a sense of the decline, brand drugs approved in 1980 received about 20 years of exclusivity on the ODB formulary; the 18 drugs approved in 1990 received 7.5 years formulary exclusivity. Second, after 1990, median exclusivity increased markedly, peaking at 17.7 years for drugs approved in 1994. This increase was short lived, however; median exclusivity periods began to decline thereafter. Drugs approved in 2004 received 7.6 years of exclusivity, and drugs approved in 2005 received 5 years of exclusivity. Repeating the analysis after removing 61 products that were line extensions did not result in any substantive changes in the results (data not shown). The linear regression analysis again shows that there was no structural break in the time trend after compulsory licensing was abolished, F(2, 23) ¼ 1.55; P ¼ .234. 
Discussion
We did not detect any systematic effects of Canada's stronger pharmaceutical IP laws on the coverage decisions of the ODB, the largest and most influential Canadian drug plan. The fraction of approved oral solid brand drugs reimbursed by the ODB did decline after the first set of IP reforms. This decline coincides with the ODB's use of pharmaco-economic appraisal to help guide coverage decisions. 15 However, it is unclear if the use of pharmaco-economic appraisal is causally related to the IP changes or would have happened in any event. Also, we did not see any pronounced IP-related changes in the period of time between drug approval and ODB listing for the drugs that were listed. There was a gradual increase in time to listing from 1974 to 2005 and then a larger increase after 2005. This latter increase is plausibly related to the introduction of the Common Drug Review, which provides recommendations on coverage to 18 federal, provincial, and territorial drug plans. The median period of formulary exclusivity for brand drugs reimbursed by ODB has also declined steadily over the last several decades. The IP changes introduced in 1993, which abolished compulsory licensing and introduced a U.S.-style linkage system, increased periods of formulary exclusivity for all drugs approved after 1993 to levels that are higher than what they would otherwise would have been. However, the rate of decline over time in formulary exclusivity observed before 1993 was also observed after 1993. We are not aware of any other research that has examined the exclusivity time of brand name drugs on public formularies. In the United States, market exclusivity for brand name drugs stayed relatively stable over the period 1995-1996 to 2011-2012, between a maximum of 13.7 years in 1996-1997 and a minimum of 12.9 years in 2011-2012. 17 While not the focus of our paper, we also observed considerable variation in the number of new drugs approved with a spike in the mid-1990s. This is consistent with what was seen in both the United States 18 and the United Kingdom. 19 However, overall, in the United Kingdom, the number of new drug introductions had no significant linear trend from 1982 to 2011.
The cause of the secular decline in the median period of ODB formulary exclusivity is an interesting question in its own right. There are several possibilities: First, generic drug companies may have become more proficient at navigating the IP regulations and gaining market entry. Second, it is possible that an increasing share of the new brand drugs are being granted exclusivity on the basis of weaker patents; this would be the case, for instance, for a sustained release formulation of a drug that was previously available in regular release form. However, our re-analysis of the data in which line extensions were removed revealed the same patterns, casting doubt on this explanation. It is also possible that the ODB changed its criteria for listing drugs. It may have started to exclude a greater percentage of drugs that offered little to no new therapeutic improvement; however, at least since 1997 the percent of new drugs that are major therapeutic advances has not changed significantly. 20 It may also have become stricter regarding the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio required for listing in the face of increasing drug prices, but the data to test this hypothesis is not available. Finally, the ODB could have taken steps to expedite generic entry, but again we are unable to test this possibility with the data on hand.
We do not believe that our results were due to changes in the length of the drug approval time for either brand or generic drugs, although this conclusion is tempered by lack of access to data over the complete time period. The time that brand name drugs spend in the approval process has declined significantly from a median of 654 days in 1985 to 346 days in 2016, whereas times for generic drugs were 342 days in 1997 and 469 days in 2016 (Therapeutic Products Directorate and Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate Annual Reports, available from publications@hc-sc.gc.ca). Therefore, brand name drugs were entering the market more rapidly while there was actually a slight slowdown in the time taken for generic products to move through the regulatory system.
Once drugs are on the market, it is up to the manufacturer to apply for listing on the formulary. These are individual company decisions for which we have no data. Similarly, we do not have any data about the time it took between an application for formulary listing and a positive decision. However, although the time to formulary listing spiked in 1991, overall there was no significant linear trend in the time taken, indicating that neither of these factors contributed to the results that we saw.
There are a number of limitations to our analysis. First, we were unable to obtain accurate NOC dates for drugs approved before 1991, and in the absence of the exact date for ODB listing, we relied on the publication date of the formulary. Second, we did not consider whether pricing of either brand or generic drugs played a role in decisions to list, as this type of information is not publicly available. With respect to pricing decisions, the Ontario government introduced a number of changes from the early 1990s onwards, including pharmaco-economic evaluations for brand-name listings in the early 1990s and changes in the allowed prices for generics in 1998, 2006, and 2010. [21] [22] [23] External factors, such as changes in the demographics of the Ontario population, may have affected listing decisions. Our tests for structural breaks in the time trends were limited by relatively small sample sizes. Finally, we note that as of 2015, the median market exclusivity time for brand name drugs in Canada was 12.3 years. 24 The fact that the exclusivity time on the ODB formulary was 5 years and that it generally only took 1 to 2 years between receipt of a NOC and formulary inclusion indicates that other factors at work limit the formulary exclusivity time. One possibility is that manufacturers may choose to withdraw products from the formulary or discontinue production altogether if sales decline. Typically, unless a drug is removed from the market for safety reasons, it remains on the formulary at the manufacturer's discretion.
In conclusion, we have shown that, except for a brief period of time, the marked strengthening of Canadian pharmaceutical IP laws over the past 25 years has not by itself had an effect on the exclusivity period that brandname drugs enjoy on the ODB formulary. In fact, exclusivity periods have been dropping more or less consistently beginning with drugs receiving an NOC in the mid-1970s, with the exception of the period from 1992 to 1999. The causes of these changes remain to be explored. 
